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The long-standing doctrine of usury has
been defined by the Maryland courts as
the taking of more interest for the use of
money or forbearance than the law allows.
Scott v. Leary, 34 Md. 389 (1871). To
constitute usury, there must be: one, a
lending of money or forbearance to collect
money due; two, an agreement that the
money shall be returned; and three, more
than legal interest must be paid. Williams
v. Reynolds, 10 Md. 57 (1856). It is a
question of the lender's intention to exact
more than the allowable legal rate of in-
terest, Curozza v. Federal Finance &
Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 131 A. 332
(1925); however, nothing in the law of
usury prevents a borrower from paying
usurious interest, if he so desires. Kirsner
v. Sun Mortgage Co., 154 Md. 682, 141
A. 398 (1928). Intent to take excessive
interest is an essential element to estab-
lish usury. Beneficial Finance Co. v. Ad-
ministrator of Loan Laws, 260 Md. 430,
272 A.2d 644 (1971).
The court here, in reaching its decision
on whether interest should be charged on
the $45,000, emphasized the fact that
this amount was never under the Lyles'
control. In qualifying the issue of control,
the court indicated that had Tri-county
placed the money in an escrow account
there would have been no question as to
control, even if the escrow was subject to
restrictions. Id. at 73,371 A.2d at 426.
In its appeal, Tri-County contended
that where a loan agreement contemplates
that the entire amount of the loan is
available to the borrower immediately,
the fact that he leaves it with the lender
for some time period does not make the
transaction usurious, absent a showing of
intent to evade the law against usury.
Judge Singley, writing for the court, dis-
counted this rule by considering: one, that
the laws against usury ought to be stricly
enforced; and, two, that no subterfuge of
a lender will be permitted to shield a
usurious loan. Id. at 74-75,371 A.2d at
427. Although the heart of the rule is the
lender's intent to evade the usury laws,
the court does not base its holding on that
point; in fact, nowhere in the opinion
does the court attempt to determine ap-
pellant's actual intent in retaining the
$45,000. As to the concept of unpaid bal-
ance, the court reasoned that this balance
was the $15,000 and not the $45,000.
The $45,000, by being in Tri-County's
business account, was totally within its
control. When the Lyles repaid Tri-Coun-
ty, they needed only to pay the sum due,
i.e. $15,000 plus interest.
The court does not mention any
benefits which the appellant may have
received by keeping the loan in its acount
and under its control. Maryland case and
statutory law indicates that the intent of
the Maryland usury statute is to prevent a
lender from obtaining an unjust bonus or
commission. See e.g., Brenner v. Plitt,
182 Md. 348, 34 A.2d 853 (1943);
Maryland Ann. Code, Art. 49 (1972).
A final point not discussed by the court
is custom and usage in the trade. The
question is whether it is customary for
Maryland loan companies, when retaining
a portion of the proceeds, to place such
proceeds in a general business account
with a record of outstanding loans. Such a
custom would seem to be contrary to the
proscriptions of the Maryland usury
statute. While some states have ruled that
custom and usage cannot legalize usury,
the question of whether the practice is
usurious has often been influenced by
commercial custom.
The court's failure to address the ele-
ment of the lender's intent may have been
a serious oversight; the case could have
been remanded to determine if a usurious
intent on the part of the appellant existed.
It seems clear, however, that the decision
in Tri-County is in line with previous
decisions of the court. The appellant
lender, having attempted to exact an
amount in excess of the legal interest rate
by a rather ingenious method, was held to
be in violation of the Maryland usury







Of all the law's intrusions into the lives
of individuals, few seem more disruptive
than the one that severs the legal bond
between parent and child-the termina-
tion of parental rights.
There is substantial confusion regard-
ing the exact nature of parental rights. At-
tempts at clarification run from consider-
ing them as a trust relationship, a compact
balancing the parent's rights against
obligations, to a cluster of "rights to"-to
have custody, to visit, to choose a name,
* J.D. 1976, University of Baltimore School of Law;
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to educate, to appoint guardians, to con-
sent to marriage and to consent to adop
tion. Ketcham and Babcock, Statutory
Standards for Involuntary Termination of
Parental Rights, 29 RUTGERS L. REw 530,
532 (1976).
Depending on the jurisdiction, termina
tion proceedings are conducted under one
of two views-the parental right or the
presumptive right view. 59 AM. JuR. 2d,
Parent and Child §26 (1971). Jurisdic-
tions following the parental right doctrine
hold that a natural parent is entitled to
custody against all others. A challenging
party must show that the natural parent is
"unfit, or forfeited his rights, or is unable
to properly care for the child, or other ex-
traordinary circumstances." Id.,§27.
Presumptive right jurisdictions hold that
parental rights are presumptive and must
yield to the "best interests of the child."
Regardless of whether the natural parent
has been found unfit, and even where he
or she has been expressly found to be fit,
the best interests of the child may dicatate
that he or she be left with a nonparent
with whom there has developed strong
ties. Id., §26. This nonparent is referred to
in the literature as the "psychological
parent." Ketchman and Babcock, supra,
536. The reasoning behind the presump-
tive right doctrine is that severe harm
would be done to a child with an emo-
tional investment in the psychological
T ~1
parent-child relationship if that relation-
ship were extinguished. This view is being
increasingly recognized by Courts. Id.,
551.
The termination proceeding is the in-
trusive instrument used by the courts to
examine the facts concerning the child's
relationships with both the natural parent
and a prospective adoptive parent. The
evidentiary burden is on the petitioning
party and the standard of proof normally
required is more than the preponderance
of the evidence. The requirement has
been variously described as "clear, clear
and conclusive, plain and certain, strong
and satisfactory, or cogent and convinc
ing." 59 Am. JuR 2d, supra, §27.
However, in Pennsylvania, the standard of
proof required is a preponderance of the
evidence. In re Rinehart, 70 District &
County Reports 2d 739 (1975).
The obverse of the parental rights coin
is parental duties. These are seen as affir
mative obligations to love, protect and
support the child. But performance of
these duties does not require the personal
presence of the parent; temporary ar-
rangements may be made for the care of
the child. Strauss, Involuntary Termina-
tion of Parental Rights under the Penn-
sylvania Adoption Act, 48 TEMPLE L.Q.
1050, 1053 (1975). However, "mere
desire to perform the duties is insufficient
to preserve the parent-child relationship."
In re Adoption of R.I., 468 Pa. 294, 361
A.2d 294 (1976).
THE CASE
On August 13, 1974, a battered, ten-
month old Melissa Pyott was admitted to
a hospital with severe bruises and dis-
colorations on her body resulting from
physical abuse by her stepfather, R.T.
Davis. A petition was filed by Chester
County Children's Services asking for in
voluntary termination of parental rights
pursuant to the Pennsylvania Adoption
Act of 1970.1 On September 20, 1974,
temporary custody of Melissa was given
to the agency. That same month the
mother, Patricia, moved to Ohio with her
husband, Melissa's stepfather, where he
had an opportunity for employment.
Sixteen months passed between the
granting of temporary custody to
Children's Services and the commence-
ment of involuntary termination proceed
ings. In this interval, the mother saw the
child once, in January 1975, at the
Chester County agency. She corre-
sponded with the agency twice, in
November, 1974 and March, 1975, ex-
pressing love and concern for the child in
both letters, and indicating a hope of
regaining custody in the second letter,
and she invited the agency to investigate
her Ohio home. Between January and
August, 1975, at the request of Chester
County Children's Services, an Ohio
Children's agency made numerous visits
to appellant's home. The mother and her
husband participated in several counsel-
ing sessions with the Ohio agency. A
monthly public assistance grant of only
Act of 1970, July 24, PL. 620, No. 208, Art II, Sec
tion 311, 1 P.S. Section 311 (Supp. 1977 78).
The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be
terminated after a petition filed pursuant to Section
312, and hearing held pursuant to Section 313, on
the ground that:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period
of at least six months either has evidenced a settled
purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child, or
has refused or failed to perform parental duties; or
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity,
abuse, neglect, refusal of the parent has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control,
or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well being and the conditions and causes of the in
capacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not
be remedied by the parent: or
(3) The parent is the presumptive but not the
natural father of the child.
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$170.00 precluded them from sending
Melissa any money or gifts. However,
Melissa was visited monthly by her mater-
nal grandmother and aunt, who brought
her clothing, toys and food. All this time
Melissa was with a foster family. As of
January 1976, the mother was living with
her sister with the announced intention of
remaining apart from her husband.
The Court of Common Pleas termi-
nated the parental rights of Patricia Pyott
Davis to Melissa Pyott under section
311 (1) of the Adoption for failure to per-
form parental duties for a period in excess
of six months.
Appellant mother raised two arguments
in her appeal. Her first contention was
that the lower court failed to consider her
"particular circumstances" and to recogn-
ize that she had used the resources at her
command in declining to yield to obsta
cles preventing her from performing her
duties. In re Adoption of McCray, 460 Pa.
210, 217, 331 A.2d 652 (1975). Sec-
ondly, she maintained that Common Pleas
incorrectly found that her mother and
sister were not acting as her proxy in her
absence, and in concluding that even if
they were, appellant did not act
unreasonably under the circumstances.
On October 28, 1977, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania reversed Common
Pleas for failing properly to apply the facts
to the law, holding that Chester County
Children's Services failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the
parental rights of Patricia Pyott Davis to
her daughter, Melissa, should be termi-
nated, In re Adoption of Pyott, -Pa.
- 380 A.2d 311 (1977). Since the ap
pellee agency failed to meet the statutory
requirement for involuntary termination,
the question of the best interests of the
child never arose.2 Even if that were con-
ceded, the Supreme Court agreed with the
mother that the lower court did not ac-
cord proper weight to her individual cir-
2 When a court is establishing facts to justify a ter
mination of parental rights, it does so without regard
to the child's best interests. But once grounds for ter
mination have been established under Section
311(1), the child's best interests are considered in
determining whether parental rights should actually
be terminated. Adoption of R.I., supro at 299.
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cumstances. The court noted an earlier
opinion in which it held that a court
... must examine the individual cir-
cumstances and any explanation
offered by the parent to determine if
that evidence, in light of the totality of
the circumstances, clearly warrants per-
mitting the involuntary termination of
parental rights... In re Adoption of Or-
wick, 464 Pa. 549, 555, 347 A.2d 677,
780 (1975).
In its analysis of appellant's explana-
tion, the Court looked to whether she met
the McCray test and used the resources at
her command and declined to yield to
obstacles preventing her from performing
her parental duties. Viewing the totality
of circumstances, the 3 2 majority opin-
ion was that Patricia Pyott Davis met the
test.
Judge Nix, writing for the majority,
viewed the mother's action of one trip to
Pennsylvania to visit Melissa, three trips
in one week from Ohio to Pennsylvania
for a custody hearing, and two com-
munications with Chester County
Children's Services advising them of her
affection and desire for her daughter's







Our Owners' or Mortgagee
Title Insurance policies are
available to you and your clients
in the following:
Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West





An affiliate of Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland
St. Paul & Lexington Sts., Baltimore, Md. 727-3700
406 Mercantile Towson Building, Towson, Md. 825-4435
APRIL, 1978 39
I
her rights, expressions of interest and con-
cern, and as an exercise of "reasonable
firmness" in meeting the McCray test.
They gave much weight to the counseling
undergone by the mother and her husband
with the Ohio agency, albeit on instruc-
tions from Chester County Children's
Services. The court rationalized that the
appellant mother was reasonably led to
believe that these sessions would preserve
her rights to her daughter.
The lower court's ruling that the grand-
mother and aunt were not acting on behalf
of the mother was found to be without
merit. Pennsylvania does not require that
a parent personally take care of a child,
and one may make reasonable arrange
ments for temporary care. In re Adoption
of Wolfe, 454 Pa. 550, 557, 312 A.2d
793, 797 (1973). The fact that the grand-
mother and aunt satisfied their own emo-
tional needs does not nullify the mother's
concern. The court said that the main
consideration is whether the mother rea
sonably relied on her family and whether
they were aware of the reliance. The
Court concluded that appellant's
testimony supported the arrangement.
The majority noted that the mother
continued to improve her environment,
culminating in the separation from her
husband, Melissa's stepfather, in order to
make it adaptable to the raising of a child.
Justice Roberts wrote a strong and ex-
tensive dissent, charging the majority
with misreading the record, erroneously
construing the standard of parental
responsibility required by the statute, and
arriving at findings not supported by the
record. He considered appellant's con-
tacts with Melissa to have been minimal
and found in the record that the counsel-
ing was unsuccessful. The record also
showed that appellant and her husband
denied any knowledge or responsibility
for Melissa's injuries, and that the Ohio
agency concluded that Melissa should not
be returned to the custody of appellant.
The dissent questioned appellant's sin-
cerity in wanting to separate from her
husband, noting that she never mentioned
that desire until the termination hearing,
and a mere two weeks before it she said
her address was in Ohio.
The minority also noted that in both
letters to Chester County Children's Serv-
~~1 1
ices, the mother expressed her desire that
Melissa be returned to her, and that her
husband shared this wish. Justice Roberts
concluded that "the decree of the
Orphans' Court is supported by compe-
tent evidence. The decree granting the
petition to terminate appellant's parental
rights should be affirmed." Pyott, supra,
at -, 380 A.2d at 325.
Despite the minority's condemnatory
reading of the record, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court majority seems to find
failure or refusal to perform parental
duties only in the most blatant situations
of neglect. As the court stated in In re
Adoption of Farabelli, 460 Pa. 423, 333
A.2d 846 (1975), "Unless there is im-
pressive evidence either of inadequacy of
the natural parent to properly care for,
provide for, maintain and guide the child
or other compelling facts dictated to the
contrary, the relationship of parent and
child should not be disturbed by granting
custody of the child to a third party."
Obviously, the court saw the facts in
the Pyott case as less than impressive evi-
dence that Patricia Pyott Davis had
neglected her parental duties toward
Melissa, and that the tenuous contacts she
maintained with Melissa were sufficient to
preserve her parental rights.
It appears that Pennsylvania is follow
ing the parental right doctrine rather than
the presumptive right doctrine. Although
there is no direct mention in the opinion
regarding any emotional investment
Melissa may have made in her foster
parents in those sixteen months, Justice
Roberts alluded to it when he cited the
legislative intent behind the Adoption Act
that when "... the possibility exists for
the child to establish an effective parent
child relationship through adoption, the
parent-child relationship may be termi
nated." Pyott, supra at __, 380 A.2d at
320. However, even had the court con-
sidered Melissa's relationship with the
foster family and found the emotional in-
vestment substantial, it is unlikely that it
would have allowed termination. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has been
unwilling to terminate a natural parent's
rights unless the record clearly shows
neglect or refusal to perform parental
duties. In re Adoption of Sarver, 444 Pa.




by Thomas G. Ross
When the management of the Sheraton
Park Hotel in Washington, D.C. first pro-
posed to improve its swimming pool
facility, they could not have envisioned
the eventual expense to the corporation of
that project. In 1968, the pool was equip-
ped with a three-meter, high performance
"Duraflex" diving board. Three years
later, an inexperienced diver, eighteen-
year-old Thomas Hooks, was propelled by
the board into shallow water where his
head was violently greeted by the pool's
floor, resulting in Hooks' quadriplegic
state.
Seeking to recover monetary damages
for his disability and medical expenses,
Hooks and his parents instituted a per-
sonal injury suit against the Sheraton con-
glomerate in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. Their
suit alleged negligence on the part of the
defendant both in the operation and con-
struction of the pool.
In a bifurcated trial on the issues of
liability and damages, a jury found
Sheraton liable to the plaintiffs for
damages of $7,000,000. Following the
jury's verdict and a defense motion, the
trial judge ordered a new trial unless
Hooks and his parents remitted the excess
of $4,500,000 and $180,000 respec-
tively. The plaintiffs filed the required
remittiturs, and Sheraton appealed the
verdict.
I. LIABILITY
In its appeal for reversal of the jury
finding of liability, Sheraton contended
that the trial judge's instructions to the
jury on two negligence issues were im-
proper and prejudicial. In writing the
THE FORUM
